














































































Bornstein & Rapoport,1988;Bornstein,Erev & Goren,1994)やIPD状況(Bornstein,1992;
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Cooperation in Social Trilemma.
Nobuhito JIN Ph.D.
An experimental paradigm is proposed for investigating interpersonal conflicts under
 
conditions of intergroup competition.The?Social Trilemma”constitutes an n-person
 
game in which the n players are divided into some groups,are each assigned monetary
 
endowment,and must then decide independently and anonymously whether to keep the
 
endowment, contribute it to the group’s benefit, or contribute it to all participants’
benefit.The group with the larger sum of contributions is provided with a monetary
 
reward,which is shared equally among all of its members regardless of their decision.
The larger sum of contribution for all participants, all participants can obtain more
 
monetary rewards(i.e.,social dilemma structure).
Assessed whether people are less or more likely to cooperate in a social dilemma when
 
it is embedded in the context of a social trilemma.109undergraduates played an ordinary
 
social dilemma game and a social trilemma game with equivalent incentive structures.
Results showed that Ss were less cooperative in the social trilemma game than in the
 
social dilemma game.
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